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Feature:
Questioning Constitutional Justice
Introduction
The Legitimacy of Constitutional Courts: Notes on Theory and Practice
Cass R. Sunstein
Everyone agrees that the job a constitutional court is
to interpret the constitution. But the fact that constitutional courts are entrusted with this job can create
two kinds of problems for politicians and, above all,
for leaders of the executive and legislative branches
of government. The first kind of problem arises
when a constitutional court invokes the unambiguous
language of the constitution to invalidate a political
act. The second kind of problem arises when a constitutional court invokes the ambiguous language of
the constitution to invalidate a political act.
These problems are quite different, and their differences bear very much on the issues discussed in
this symposium. When a court invokes unambiguous constitutional language to prevent politicians
from doing what they want, politicians may suffer
intense frustration. And if the court has the strength
to resist politicians, constitutional amendment may
be the only course. But from the standpoint of the
rule of law, and constitutionalism itself, the politicians' frustration is no cause for alarm. It is part of the
point. If a constitutional amendment is necessary,
and the constitutional court invokes unambiguous
language to say so, constitutional democracy is working very well. Frustrated politicians who attempt to
"tame" the court, by bending it to their wishes, are
making a travesty of the rule of law and the whole
project of constitutional democracy. They may also

be harming their long-term interests. Politicians can

benefit from an independent court; such a court can
enable politicians to insulate themselves from pressures that they would like to avoid, and such a court
can allow politicians the potential advantage of pointing to constitutional constraints, enforced by the
court, as a limitation on their power of action.
Things are different when the governing constitutional provision is ambiguous-when reasonable
people can interpret that provision in diverse ways.
If a court invokes ambiguous language to strike
down a political act, politicians may claim that the
court's interpretation is erroneous, that the court is
following not law but personal predilection, and
hence that the politicians, rather than the judges,
are the constitution's true loyalists. Of course many
constitutional provisions are ambiguous. How do
social and economic guarantees bear on political
effort to change the fabric of socialist law? Does a
constitutional ban on inequality, or a requirement
of equal treatment, forbid discrimination on the
basis of sex? In education? In the military? Does an
equality provision forbid discrimination on the
basis of homosexuality, or disability? Does a right to
free speech protect the right to urge crime, revolution, or hatred of ethnic and religious groups? Does
it include the right to engage in unrestricted commercial advertising or to spread pornography?
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These-are questions on which constitutional provisions are frequently ambiguous, and when politicians disagree with the Court, they may well claim
to do so in the constitution's name. Their objection
isto the court, not to the constitution.
These observations show the complexity of
the notions of "judicial activism" or "an activist
court." A court that invokes the unambiguous language of the constitution may be described as
"activist" if and in the sense that it invalidates acts
of public officials. But this form of activism is far
from troubling. On the contrary, it is a tribute to
the rule of law. Hence a court that ignores the
unambiguous language of the constitution in order
to permit public officials to do as they choose might
also be described as "activist," though in a very different sense. Such a court is capitulating to the
political winds; it is allowing the constitution to
dissipate under pressure. We can conclude that
when a constitution is clear, it should be obeyed;
that the minimal role of a constitutional court lies
here; and that the proper question to ask of such a
court in such a case is whether it has or has not
capitulated to politics.
A court that deals with ambiguous provisions
is much harder to evaluate. Some people think
that courts should consider themselves the special
guardians of their constitutions, so thatjudicial use
of ambiguous provisions, to invalidate public acts,
is entirely acceptable. (In the United States, this
position is sometimes associated with Ronald
Dworkin; it is also one view of the situation in
Hungary.) But some people think that the court
should uphold public acts if the constitution contains any uncertainty. (In the United States, this
position is sometimes associated with James
Bradley Thayer; it is one view of the situation in
Russia.) (Table 1)
TABLE I
Constitution unambiguous
against act in question
Invalidate act
Validate act

(1) Rule of Law
(2) Cowardice; capitulation
I
to politics

Cells (1) and (2) are simple; the most serious
question is whether the court will capitulate, and
the answer is that it should not if constitutional
democracy is to prevail. The hardest puzzles arise
for constitutional courts when those courts are
asked to invoke the ambiguous language of the constitution to invalidate acts of public officials. Whypoliticians might and will predictably ask-should
courts be allowed to interpret ambiguous language
as they wish, especially in light of the fact that the
interpretation of such language will inevitably
-involve not merely "law" but also the judges' own
judgments of policy or principle? Interpretation of
ambiguous language cannot avoid some such judgments. The vice of "formalism" can be found whenever judges claim, falsely, that they are simply
speaking for "the law," and deny the role of their
own values in interpretation. Formalism is a pervasive risk for cells (2) and (3).
But there are some answers to the politician's
question about why courts should feel free to interpret ambiguous language to invalidate acts of other
public officials. In ordinary life, we frequently confront ambiguous language, and we know that some
interpretations are better than others. So, too,
ambiguous constitutional language can be interpreted well or poorly; much depends on the context and
the purposes of the relevant language. And perhaps
judges are in an especially good position to interpret
ambiguous provisions, precisely because they are
insulated from political forces. In other words,
judges' comparative independence may be a virtue,
not a vice, even or perhaps especially if the interpretation calls for a judgment of principle. If the question is the scope of religious liberty, it is possible that
courts are in a particularly good position to make
reasonable judgments, and hence that while
respectful of the decisions of public officials, courts
charged with constitutional
interpretation should feel to
reject those decisions if they

Constitution ambiguous
(3)Judidal overreaching (?)
(4) Excessive judicial
caution (?)
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seem inconsistent with the
best understanding of the
constitutional guarantee.
There is a more fundamental point. We should
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not be too quick to identify the outcomes of any particular political process with democracy. Perhaps
the best course isfor a constitutionalcourt to interpret
ambiguous provisions by reference to democratic ideals
themselves-by, for example, assuming an especially
large role when rights central to democratic government are at stake, or when groups not able to
protect themselves through ordinary politics are at
risk. This view, associated with both John Hart Ely
(in the United States) and Jurgen Habermas (in
Germany), lays great stress on what might be called
the internal morality of democracy. Thus it might
be said that courts should aggressively review any
effort to stifle political dissent (by, for example, limiting criticism of public officials, or reducing the
areas where dissenters can make their view heard),
and also take strong steps to ensure full political participation and to counteract discrimination against
groups at systematic risk in the political process,
such as religious and ethnic minorities.
We might therefore conclude, at least provisionally, that a constitutional court acts legitimately
when it invokes unambiguous constitutional provisions and when it interprets ambiguous provisions by reference to democratic ideals. When
people question constitutional justice, these ideas
provide a good place to start. But they raise questions of their own. Democratic ideals can themselves be ambiguous: What do such ideals require
in the context of (say) libel law and equality on the
basis of sex? In any case a constitutional court will
inevitably be dependent on a constellation of political forces that will constrain it in one way or
another. That latter lesson-involving the complex
relations between theories of legitimacy and practical constraints on legitimacy-may be the principal one emerging from this symposium. Thus a
full understanding of constitutional justice would
have to consider not only accounts of democracy
and (closely related) accounts of legal interpretation; it would also have to connect those accounts
to an understanding of real-world limitations on
what constitutional courts, consisting of human
beings whose reputations, employment, and sometimes even lives may be on the line, are actually
permitted to do.

Belarus
Interview with Former Constitutional Court
Justice Mikhail Chudakou
Alexander Lukashuk
Mikhail Chudakou was born in 1949. In 1972, hegraduatedfrom BelarusianState University (BSU), worked in
the attorneygeneral'soffice as assistantcounsel in civil mattersfrom 1972-1976, and completed his doctorate, 'The
Legal Problems of Individual Participation in Direct
Democracy in the USSR," in 1982. From 1977 to the presen4 he has taught at BSU. From 1990 to 1994 he was a
member of the ConstitutionalCommission ang in June
1996, he became a member ofthe ConstitutionalCourt.In
protestagainstthe president'sDecember 1996 referendum,
JusticeChudakov resignedfrom the Court onJanuary23,
1997 Before the referendum the Court had 11 members.
Followingthe referendum seven members resigned or were
fired. On January 4, the president reappointed the four
remainingjustices to the Court and appointed two others.
On January 24, the Council of the Republic (the upper
house of the NationalAssembly) appointedfive morejustices. The post-referendum Court has 12 seats, although to
date only 11 seats have beenfied
Alexander Lukashuk: The first Constitutional
Court of Belarus existed for two and a half years.
What favored and what hampered the work of
the Court?
Mikhail Chudakou: First, the executive branch's
antagonism toward thejudiciary made it impossible
to work in a normal way. Our invalidation of presidential decrees was invariably perceived by the executive as intentionally hostile. The executive viewed
the Court as a functionary of the opposition. Another
factor was that, in the majority of cases, one ofthejustices always would deliver a "special opinion." Today,
the author of these "special opinions" is the new chairman of the Court, Ryhor Vasilevich. The purpose of
these "special opinions" was to argue in legal terms
why the president was always right. They had a particularly detrimental effect on the Court.
AL: Were these "special opinions" political rather
than legal arguments?
MC: Yes. The public perception was that while
one group of justices supported one approach,
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